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Notes
DAVIS v. UNITED STATES: GOOD FAITH,
RETROACTIVITY, AND THE LOSS OF PRINCIPLE
DAVID MCALOON ∗
In Davis v. United States, 1 the Supreme Court of the United States
held that evidence seized by the police in violation of the Fourth
Amendment was admissible because the police performed their
search in good-faith reliance on binding appellate precedent. 2 In so
holding, the Court abandoned the principle of treating similarly situated defendants the same and drew into question the integrity of
judicial review. 3 This decision marks another step in the turn away
from the principled justifications for the exclusionary rule toward a
deterrence-only rationale that acknowledges a right with no remedy. 4
As a result, the evolution of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence will
cease as defendants have little to no incentive to challenge existing
precedent, while law enforcement will be further emboldened to challenge the edges of what is constitutionally acceptable. 5 Alternatively,
the Court should have taken the unremarkable step of simply applying its own precedent appropriately, rather than crafting a new goodfaith exception at odds with the principles of our criminal justice system. 6
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1. 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
2. See infra Part III.
3. See infra Part IV.A.1.
4. See infra Part IV.A.2.
5. See infra Part IV.B.
6. See infra Part IV.C.
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I. THE CASE
On April 27, 2007, Willie Gene Davis was the passenger in a car
that police pulled over for violation of a noise ordinance. 7 Davis initially told police that his name was Ernest Harris. 8 When police discovered that Davis was lying about his name, they arrested him for
providing false information. 9 Police had asked Davis to step out of
the car and keep his jacket on, but instead Davis removed his jacket
and left it on the front passenger seat of the car. 10 Police then escorted him to their squad car. 11 They returned to and searched the
passenger compartment where Davis had been sitting and discovered
a revolver in the pocket of Davis’s jacket. 12
On October 27, 2007, Davis was indicted as a felon in possession
of a revolver in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 13 Davis moved to
suppress the gun, arguing that it was obtained by an illegal search of
the automobile, in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. 14 The
United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama denied
Davis’s motion because the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
grants officers the ability to conduct a contemporaneous warrantless
search of the passenger compartment and containers incident to an
arrest. 15 Davis preserved for appeal his objection to the decision, arguing that the outcome of Arizona v. Gant, 16 soon to be decided by the
United States Supreme Court, could affect whether Davis’s gun could
be admitted into evidence. 17 A jury convicted Davis, and he was sentenced to 220 months in prison. 18
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Gant, the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the police search did vi-

7. United States v. Davis, No. 2:07-cr-0248-WKW, 2008 WL 1927377, at *2 (M.D. Ala.
Apr. 28, 2008), aff’d, 598 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. Davis argued that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment unless they fall within a set of well-defined exceptions, and that the
facts of this case do not fall within any such exception. Id. at *2–3.
15. Id. at *3 (citing United States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819, 825 (11th Cir. 1996), abrogated by Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009)).
16. 162 P.3d 640 (Ariz. 2007), aff’d, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
17. Davis, 2008 WL 1927377, at *1–2.
18. United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1262 (11th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2419
(2011).
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olate Davis’s Fourth Amendment rights, but further concluded that
the evidence would not be suppressed because the search was done in
good-faith reliance on appellate precedent. 19 The court first reasoned that—under Gant’s new formulation—police could only conduct their search if Davis was “within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.” 20 Since Davis was sitting
in the squad car at the time of the search, the court reasoned that, if
Gant applied retroactively to Davis’s case, then police violated Davis’s
Fourth Amendment rights. 21 Because Supreme Court decisions are
applied retroactively to all cases on appeal at the time of the decision,
the court applied Gant to Davis’s case and held that the police violated Davis’s Fourth Amendment rights.22
The Court of Appeals would not conclude, however, that exclusion of evidence naturally follows from a Fourth Amendment violation. 23 Reasoning that exclusion of evidence is not an individual
right, but exists only to deter police misconduct, the Court of Appeals
concluded that exclusion should not apply to deter objectively reasonable police activity. 24 Given that police were acting in accordance
with United States v. Gonzalez, 25 the court applied a good-faith exception to their actions and refused to apply the exclusionary rule to Davis’s case as doing so would serve no deterrent purpose. 26
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
whether the exclusionary rule should apply when police conduct a
search in compliance with binding precedent that is later overruled. 27
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals “against unreasonable searches and seizures.” 28 The scope of that right and how best to

19. Id. at 1263, 1267–68.
20. Id. at 1262 (quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 343) (internal quotation marks omitted).
21. Id. at 1263.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1265–66.
25. 71 F.3d 819 (11th Cir. 1996), abrogated by Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
Gonzalez held that police officers could search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s
arrest regardless of the occupant’s actual control over the passenger compartment. Id. at
825.
26. Davis, 598 F.3d at 1268.
27. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 502 (2010).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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secure it has been the subject of numerous Supreme Court cases 29
and extensive literature. 30
This Part will deal first with the change in law that prompted Davis’s appeal: how the Fourth Amendment applies to the search of an
automobile as an incident to arrest. 31 Second, this Part will outline
the history of the exclusionary rule, from its principled origins to its
recent shift to a deterrence-only rationale. 32 Third, this Part will address how the principled and deterrence-only rationales have affected
the applicability of the exclusionary rule in the context of good-faith
exceptions and the retroactive application of exclusion. 33
A. That Is Not What We Meant: The Supreme Court Limits Allowable
Automobile Searches After a Straightforward Rule Proves to Be Not So
Straightforward
The Court has held that “searches conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment [but for] a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions.” 34 One such exception is
a search of the person performed incident to arrest. 35 The Court has

29. A search of the Supreme Court database maintained by Washington University in
St. Louis showed that the Court has heard 305 cases related to search and seizure/Fourth
Amendment issues from 1946–2010. Analysis of Supreme Court Decisions, THE SUPREME
COURT DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu/analysis.php (follow “Criminal Procedure”
hyperlink; then highlight “search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime
Control Act)” and “search and seizure, vehicles”; then follow “Analyze” hyperlink).
30. A Westlaw search of “Fourth Amendment” in law reviews and journals generated
281 results for a one-year period, from April 12, 2011, to April 12, 2012.
31. See infra Part II.A.
32. See infra Part II.B.
33. See infra Part II.C.
34. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnote omitted).
35. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (holding that, because a
custodial arrest based on probable cause is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a
search of the person incident to that arrest is also reasonable). The search incident to arrest has a back-and-forth history in the Supreme Court, with cases seemingly contradicting
each other from one to the next. The idea of a search incident to arrest made its first appearance in dictum in Weeks v. United States, when the Court stated that the right “to search
the person of the accused when legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime” was “always recognized under English and American law.” 232 U.S. 383,
392 (1914). The Court expanded the right from persons to places, though again in dictum, in Agnello v. United States. 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925) (“The right without a search warrant
contemporaneously to search persons lawfully arrested while committing crime and to
search the place where the arrest is made . . . is not to be doubted.”). This idea moved
from dictum to holding in Marron v. United States. 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927) (holding that
federal agents had a right to search an arrestee’s premises contemporaneously to the arrest “in order to find and seize things used to carry on the criminal enterprise”).
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also allowed a search incident to arrest to include the area within the
arrestee’s immediate control. 36 The Court included an arrestee’s
immediate control (1) to protect officer safety, because the arrestee
might have a weapon to resist arrest or escape, and (2) to prevent the
destruction of evidence. 37
In the context of automobile searches, the Court focused on officer safety, but also wanted to provide a straightforward rule for police to apply and grant an automatic right to search automobiles. Relying on the twin rationales of officer safety and protection of
evidence, the Court held in New York v. Belton that the search incident
to arrest exception included the interior of automobiles. 38 The Court
reasoned that the relatively small size of the passenger compartment
is invariably within the immediate control of an arrestee, and therefore an arrestee might easily reach for a weapon or destroy evidence. 39
The Belton Court also focused on the need for a straightforward
rule to apply to the search of an automobile incident to arrest. 40 Instead of trying to determine the area of immediate control for automobiles on a case-by-case basis, the Court reasoned that a bright-line
rule would provide certainty to individuals as to the scope of their
constitutional rights and to police officers as to the scope of their authority to search. 41 Therefore, the Court held that searches of an automobile incident to a lawful arrest were reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. 42
Following Belton, the circuit courts remained divided over the
scope of allowable searches of automobiles incident to arrest, particularly when the arrestee was already out of the vehicle when the search
was performed. Some courts focused more on the concern for officer
safety and preventing the destruction of evidence. 43 When courts applied this logic, they held that searches were unreasonable when the

36. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
37. Id. at 763–64 & n.9.
38. 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981). This automobile exception to the warrant requirement
for searches is distinct from the Carroll doctrine, which allows officers to search an automobile without a warrant whenever they have probable cause to believe evidence of a
crime is inside the automobile. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925). This
includes any containers inside the car. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579 (1991).
39. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
40. Id. at 459–60.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 460.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 324 F.3d 375, 379 (5th Cir. 2003) (“The principle
behind Belton and Chimel is to protect police officers and citizens . . . from the actions of an
arrestee who might gain access to a weapon or destructible evidence.”).
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arrestee was not in the vicinity of the automobile. 44 Conversely, some
federal circuit courts focused more on the Belton Court’s desire to
create a straightforward rule. 45 In these situations, courts upheld
searches of automobiles as incident to arrest, even when the arrestee
was not within reaching distance of the vehicle. 46 As the law developed, some members of the Supreme Court noted the circuit split
and expressed concern that police had assumed too much authority
as a result of the Belton ruling. 47
Given the circuit split over Belton’s scope and some concern that
police were overreaching in their practice, the Court returned to the
issue of automobile searches incident to arrest in Arizona v. Gant. 48
There the Court said that treating Belton as presumptively allowing
searches of cars incident to arrest created a “police entitlement rather
than . . . an exception” to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. 49 The Court reasoned that giving Belton such a broad reading
“untether[ed] the rule from [its original] justifications” of officer
safety and the need to prevent destruction of evidence. 50 The Court
therefore held that the search of a vehicle incident to arrest is valid
only when the occupant is unsecured and within reaching distance of

44. E.g., id. at 379 (finding that the search of an arrestee’s vehicle was unjustified given
that the arrestee was lying face down, handcuffed, surrounded by four police officers, six
to ten feet away from the automobile); United States v. Edwards, 632 F.3d 633, 643–44
(10th Cir. 2001) (rejecting “any justification” for police search of an automobile where the
arrestee was in the squad car 100–150 feet away from his vehicle, as there was no danger
the arrestee could reach a weapon or destroy evidence); United States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d
782, 787 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding a search of an arrestee’s vehicle unjustified when arrestee
was handcuffed in the back of the police car).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Hrasky, 453 F.3d 1099, 1102–03 (8th Cir. 2006) (upholding a search as valid under Belton, even though the arrestee had been arrested and sitting
in a police car for sixty minutes because police need a clear, readily understandable rule).
46. See id. at 1103 (upholding a search where arrestee was secured in police car); see
also United States v. White, 871 F.2d 41, 44 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding that, under Belton, a
search incident to arrest is valid whether or not the arrestee is within reach of the car and
its contents at the time of the search), overrulled by United States v. Buford, 632 F.3d 264
(6th Cir. 2011).
47. See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 628–29 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment) (questioning the reasoning of Belton that the passenger compartment is
inevitably within the arrestee’s immediate control and recognizing that police have treated
the right to search a car—regardless of the facts—as presumptively reasonable); see also id.
at 624 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part) (expressing concern that “lower court decisions
seem now to treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant
as a police entitlement rather than as an exception”).
48. 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
49. Id. at 342 (quoting Thornton, 541 U.S. at 624 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part)).
50. Id. at 343.

1264

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1258

the passenger compartment at the time of the search. 51 Writing in
dissent, Justice Alito suggested that while the Court did not explicitly
state as much, its decision overturned Belton, which in practice would
cause the suppression of evidence gathered in searches carried out in
good-faith reliance on settled case law. 52
B. From Principle to Empirical: The Court’s Remedy for Fourth
Amendment Violations
When police seize evidence illegally, the remedy for that Fourth
Amendment violation is the exclusion of that evidence. 53 This section
explores the history of the exclusionary rule and its justification by the
Court. The Court first defended the exclusion of evidence as a necessary component of the Fourth Amendment that was vital to maintaining the rule of law. More recently, the Court has said that exclusion is
a judicially created remedy that can only be justified when it “pays its
way” by objectively measuring its deterrent value against the cost of
letting criminals go free.
The first time the Court excluded evidence solely because police
violated the Fourth Amendment was in Weeks v. United States. 54 In
Weeks, the Court refused to admit into evidence letters and papers
seized from Weeks’s home in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 55
The Court rested its reasoning on the idea that the government
should not benefit from acting illegally. 56 Moreover, the Court was
concerned that allowing illegally seized evidence might also taint the

51. Id. Additionally, the Court granted that searches would be valid if in pursuit of
evidence related to the crime that caused the arrest. Id. It should be noted that the Court
has also created exceptions to search automobiles where there is reasonable suspicion to
believe that the suspect is dangerous, Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1051 (1983), and
where police have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of a crime,
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982).
52. Gant, 556 U.S. at 355–56 (Alito, J., dissenting).
53. Congress has also made it possible for a victim of a Fourth Amendment violation to
sue the individual officer or his or her department under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). That
remedy falls outside the scope of this Note.
54. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Excluding evidence as a remedy was first used in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). There, however, exclusion was justified because police had
violated the defendant’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. Id. at 633, 638 (finding that
compelling a man to produce his personal papers so that they could be used against him
at trial violated the right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment and constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment).
55. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
56. See id. at 394 (suggesting that admitting tainted evidence into trial would “affirm by
judicial decision a manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution”).
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integrity of the court system. 57 Ultimately, the Court concluded that
without the exclusion of evidence, the Fourth Amendment would
have no value and “might as well be stricken from the Constitution.” 58
This idea that the exclusion of evidence is a necessary component of
Fourth Amendment protection continued throughout most of the
first half of the twentieth century. 59
The Court’s shift away from this original principle began when
the question of whether the Fourth Amendment should be incorporated onto the states was presented in Wolf v. Colorado. 60 In Wolf, the
Court acknowledged that the right of privacy protected by the Fourth
Amendment was necessary in a free society and therefore should apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 61 But the
Court refused to agree that exclusion of evidence was a necessary,
constitutional requirement to guarantee Fourth Amendment protection. 62 It instead suggested that exclusion was a judicially created remedy, and that crafting appropriate remedies for Fourth Amendment
violations would be better left to the states. 63
When the Supreme Court ultimately found that the exclusionary
rule applied to the states, it returned to the idea of judicial integrity,
but also reasoned that exclusion would serve to deter police misconduct. In Mapp v. Ohio, 64 despite Mapp’s protests and without a search
warrant, state officers forced entry into her house to look for a suspect
they wanted to question in connection with a bombing. 65 Once inside, officers discovered obscene materials and arrested Mapp for
their possession. 66 The Court found that the police violated Mapp’s
57. See id. at 392 (stating that the government’s efforts to obtain a conviction through
means that destroy constitutional rights “should find no sanction in the judgment of the
courts”).
58. Id. at 393.
59. See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948) (stating that the
Fourth Amendment protects “the innocent and guilty alike,” and that the law provides exclusion of evidence to secure constitutional protection); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (finding that “the [g]overnment’s own wrong cannot
be used,” or else the Fourth Amendment would be reduced “to a form of words”).
60. 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
61. Id. at 28.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 28, 32.
64. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
65. Id. at 644. The police came to Mapp’s house twice that day. Id. After Mapp first
denied police entry, they returned a second time, handing her a piece of paper they
claimed was a search warrant, which Mapp stuffed into her bosom. Id. Officers struggled
with Mapp to get the paper back, ultimately “[r]unning roughshod over . . . [her].” Id. at
644–45.
66. Id. at 645.
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Fourth Amendment rights, and held that the evidence obtained as a
result of the unlawful search was “inadmissible in a state court.” 67 In
so holding, the Court stressed the importance of judicial integrity and
the principle that the exclusionary rule has its origins in the Constitution. 68 It also concluded that states had failed to provide appropriate
remedies for Fourth Amendment violations without the exclusionary
rule. 69 The Court further reasoned that the government and its court
system would lose legitimacy if they did not follow their own laws. 70
Finally, the Court suggested that the exclusionary rule is necessary as
a deterrent to bad police action. 71
After Mapp, the Court gradually abandoned judicial integrity as a
justification for the exclusionary rule and instead focused on deterrence as the sole justification for the exclusion of evidence. 72 Indeed,
in United States v. Calandra, 73 the Court completely reframed the purpose and meaning of the exclusionary rule. In Calandra, the Court
refused to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment from grand jury proceedings. 74 The Court’s decision relied entirely on the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule. 75
The Court reasoned that exclusion is not implicit in the Fourth
Amendment but is instead a judicially created remedy. 76 It stated further that exclusion was not an individual right guaranteed by the
Constitution, 77 and therefore concluded that the Constitution does

67. Id. at 655.
68. Id. at 659, 649.
69. Id. at 651–52.
70. Id. at 659.
71. See id. at 656 (“[T]he purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter [unlawful conduct] . . . by removing the incentive to disregard [the Fourth Amendment].” (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see
also id. at 670 (Douglas, J., concurring) (discussing the failure of other remedies at the
state level to prevent law enforcement from engaging in the “‘shabby business’ of unlawful
entry into a home”).
72. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 413 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (stating that the exclusionary rule “rested
on a theory that suppression of evidence in these circumstances was imperative to deter
law enforcement authorities from using improper methods to obtain evidence”). Chief
Justice Burger reframed the discussion of the exclusionary rule by questioning its continued validity in the absence of evidence of deterrence. See id. at 416.
73. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
74. Id. at 351–52.
75. See id. at 347 (“[T]he rule’s prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct . . . .”).
76. Id. at 348.
77. Id. at 347 (“The purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress the injury to
the . . . victim.”).
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not prevent the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings. 78
Instead, as with any other judicially created remedy, exclusion would
only be proper where its deterrent purpose is most effectively
served. 79 Reasoning that police are motivated by convictions in criminal proceedings, the Court found that excluding evidence from
grand jury proceedings would not deter police misconduct, and
therefore the exclusionary rule should not apply. 80
After Calandra, deterrence continued to be the touchstone for
the applicability of the exclusionary rule, 81 subject to an objective
study of the costs and benefits of exclusion. 82 Furthermore, the Court
shifted its analytical focus from the rights of the individual defendant
to the social costs of excluding evidence. 83 The Court’s cost-benefit
measure of exclusion ultimately justified the creation of exceptions to
the exclusionary rule and called into question the rule’s retroactive
application.
C. Deterrence v. Principle: The Exclusionary Rule Applied (and Limited)
By turning away from the principled justification towards a deterrence-only rationale, the Court limited the application of the exclusionary rule to scenarios where deterrence was thought to be most effectively served. This shift led the Court to create many exceptions to
the exclusionary rule where police officers conducted their search in
objective good faith. 84 Deterrence was also initially used as grounds to
refuse to apply the exclusionary rule retroactively. But the deterrence
rationale would ultimately give way to principle in the context of retroactivity. 85
78. Id. at 348.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 351–52.
81. See, e.g., Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364 (1998) (refusing to
exclude evidence from parole hearings “because application of the rule in the criminal
trial context already provides significant deterrence of unconstitutional searches”); Illinois
v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 352–53 (1987) (creating a good-faith exception for police reliance
on “statute prior to the declaration of its invalidity” since those acting in good faith cannot
be deterred).
82. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907–08 n.6 (1984) (using empirical data to
note that the exclusionary rule, as any rule of evidence that might bar reliable, probative
evidence from the jury, must “pay its way”).
83. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009) (“First, the exclusionary rule
is not an individual right and applies only where it result[s] in appreciable deterrence. . . .
In addition, the benefits of deterrence must outweigh the costs.”) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted)).
84. See infra Part II.C.1.
85. See infra Part II.C.2.
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1. Deterrence Applied: The Court Refuses to Exclude Evidence When
Law Enforcement Innocently Violate Fourth Amendment Rights
The deterrence rationale narrowed the scope of the exclusionary
rule with the introduction of the good-faith exception. Reasoning
that officers who act in good faith cannot be deterred, the Court has
said that evidence will not be excluded where police rely in good faith
on a warrant later found invalid; where police rely on a statute later
overturned; where police rely on a judicial database informing them
of an outstanding warrant later found to be false; and where police
rely on their own database’s list of outstanding warrants that later
turns out to be incorrect.
The Court first created the good-faith exception in United States
v. Leon. 86 In Leon, police searched Leon’s home pursuant to a magistrate-issued warrant that a court later found invalid. 87 The Court acknowledged that many prior cases had implied that the exclusionary
rule was “a necessary corollary of the Fourth Amendment,” but rejected this reasoning by suggesting that the Fourth Amendment contains no express provision preventing the use of tainted evidence. 88
Instead, the Court stated that the exclusionary rule is “a judicially
created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights
generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.” 89 The Court noted the huge social costs of letting the guilty go free and concluded that the exclusionary rule should only apply where deterrence is best served. 90 If the
police believed they were acting legally, then excluding the evidence
would not deter their actions in the future. 91 The Court concluded
that the exclusionary rule should not apply when police act in objectively reasonable good faith on a magistrate’s issuance of a warrant. 92
Following Leon, the Court created other exceptions to the exclusionary rule on the basis of police acting in good faith, each time relying on the deterrence rationale. In Illinois v. Krull, the Court refused
to exclude evidence where police performed a warrantless administrative search in reliance on a statute that was later found invalid. 93 In
86. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
87. Id. at 903 & n.2.
88. Id. at 905–06.
89. Id. at 906 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
90. Id. at 907–08.
91. Id. at 918–19.
92. Id. at 926.
93. 480 U.S. 340, 342–43, 349–53 (1987).
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Arizona v. Evans, officers acted in reliance on a court clerk’s record of
an outstanding arrest warrant later found to be erroneous. 94 The
Court refused to suppress evidence found in a search incident to that
false arrest, as police had acted in reasonable reliance on the court
employees and were therefore undeterrable. 95 Finally, in Herring v.
United States, the facts were nearly identical to Evans with one distinction: the police department made the clerical errors rather than the
court system. 96 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that excluding the
evidence discovered as a result of the unlawful arrest would not deter
police misconduct since the failure to update the police database was
negligent and not indicative of some systemic error or reckless disregard for constitutional requirements. 97 The deterrence rationale, as
expressed in these good-faith exceptions, has greatly limited the
depth of the exclusionary rule and initially limited the breadth of the
rule’s applicability in the context of retroactivity.
2. Principle Applied: The Court Abandons the Deterrence Rationale
in the Name of Even-Handed Justice and Applies the Exclusionary
Rule Retroactively
Retroactivity deals with how broadly a new rule of criminal procedure will be applied. When on June 19, 1961, the Court in Mapp v.
Ohio declared that the exclusionary rule applied to the states, the
question became whether the rule would apply only prospectively or
retroactively as well. 98 If the rule were to apply only prospectively, it
would only apply to defendants whose trials were decided after June
19, 1961. 99 If the rule were to apply retroactively, it would apply to defendants whose trials had already concluded but whose convictions
were still proceeding through the appellate process and were on direct review or even to defendants who had already been through both
trial and appeal, but were attempting to re-litigate their cases by way
of collateral review. Initially, the Court crafted a three-pronged test
that focused on the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule and
only applied the exclusionary rule prospectively. The Court later
found that this test treated similarly situated defendants differently
94. 514 U.S. 1, 4 (1995).
95. Id. at 15–16.
96. 555 U.S. 135, 137–38 (2009).
97. Id. at 144–46.
98. Following Mapp v. Ohio, there was a split of authority among several courts of appeals concerning its retroactivity. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 620 n.2 (1965), overruled by Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
99. See, e.g., id. (holding that Mapp was to apply only prospectively).
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and forced courts to ignore existing law. Ultimately, the Court rejected the deterrence rationale and embraced principled justifications
of retroactivity for those still on direct review.
In Linkletter v. Walker, the Court relied on the deterrence rationale and held that the exclusionary rule would not be available for
defendants whose convictions were final at the time Mapp v. Ohio was
announced. 100 The Court listed three elements to examine in determining whether a new rule of criminal procedure should be given retroactive effect: the purpose of the new rule, the reliance placed upon
the old rule, and the effect of a retroactive application of the new rule
on the administration of justice. 101 First, emphasizing that the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule was to deter lawless police conduct, 102 the Linkletter Court reasoned that the police misconduct had
already occurred and would not be deterred by releasing prisoners. 103
As to the second prong, the Court found that states had relied on and
obtained convictions in the absence of an exclusionary rule in state
proceedings prior to Mapp. 104 Under the third prong of the analysis,
the Court found that relitigating cases “would tax the administration
of justice to the utmost.” 105 Therefore, under Linkletter, the exclusionary rule would not be applied retroactively to cases already final. 106
The Court reevaluated its retroactivity doctrine, returned to
principle, and ultimately overturned Linkletter and its progeny in Griffith v. Kentucky. 107 In Griffith, the Court held that a “failure to apply a
newly declared constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on direct
review violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication.” 108 The
Court first reasoned that, under Article III, its job was to adjudicate
cases and controversies, not to promulgate new rules of constitutional
criminal procedure. 109 Accordingly, “the integrity of judicial review
requires that [the Court] apply [the new] rule to all similar cases
100. Id. at 622, 636–37. In a footnote, the Court described convictions that were final as
ones “where the judgment of conviction was rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted,
and the time for petition for certiorari had elapsed before our decision in Mapp v. Ohio.”
Id. at 622 n.5.
101. Id. at 636.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 637.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. The Court used similar reasoning in the context of Miranda warnings to hold that
even defendants still on direct review would not “benefit fully from . . . new standards governing in-custody interrogation.” Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729–32 (1966).
107. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
108. Id. at 322.
109. Id.
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pending on direct review.” 110 Failure to apply the law as it is understood would call into question the entire purpose of the court system. 111
Second, the Court reasoned that “selective application of new
rules violates the principle of treating similarly situated defendants
the same.” 112 Stressing principles of fairness and equality under the
law, the Court stated that it does not resolve only one case based on
its best understanding of the law and then neglect to apply that understanding to all other cases. 113 Otherwise, courts would essentially
be disregarding current law. 114 Therefore, the Court held “that a new
rule [of criminal procedure] is to be applied retroactively to all cases,
state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final.” 115
The good-faith exceptions and the retroactivity doctrine affect
the application of the exclusionary rule. In the good-faith exceptions
and the retroactivity doctrine, deterrence plays a role. But where the
retroactivity jurisprudence first focused on the deterrent purpose of
exclusion in deciding whether the rule would apply, the principle
eventually triumphed over deterrence. Conversely, the good-faith exceptions are rooted in the Court’s shift in focus from principle to a
deterrence-only rationale.
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Davis v. United States, the Supreme Court of the United States
affirmed the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that
a gun found in Davis’s jacket was properly admitted into evidence
against him. 116 The Court reasoned that, because the purpose of excluding evidence is to deter police conduct, when police act in goodfaith reliance on binding appellate precedent, excluding the fruits of
that search serves no deterrent purpose, and therefore exclusion
would not apply. 117

110. Id. at 323.
111. See id. (“If we do not resolve all cases before us on direct review in light of our best
understanding of governing constitutional principles, it is difficult to see why we should so
adjudicate any case at all.” (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 326.
115. Id. at 328.
116. 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2425–26, 2429 (2011).
117. Id. at 2423–24, 2426.
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Justice Alito’s majority opinion stated that the “sole purpose [behind suppressing evidence] is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations.” 118 The Court reasoned that the exclusionary rule “is a prudential doctrine, . . . created by [the] Court to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty” of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures. 119 “Exclusion is not,” the Court reasoned,
“a personal constitutional right, nor is it designed to redress the injury
occasioned by an unconstitutional search.” 120 Exclusion is only applicable where it would lead to “appreciable deterrence” of future police
violations. 121 The Court does not reflexively apply exclusion to every
Fourth Amendment violation, but instead weighs the costs and deterrence benefits of exclusion. 122 As such, the Court continued, a main
component of the cost-benefit analysis in determining the efficacy of
exclusion is the culpability of the offending officer. 123
Applying this rationale to Davis’s situation, the Court concluded
that, although police violated Davis’s Fourth Amendment rights, they
had acted in reliance on binding precedent, and their actions were
therefore not culpable. 124 The Court reasoned that at the time police
searched Davis’s jacket, their actions were constitutional under New
York v. Belton. 125 It was not until two years after Davis’s search that the
Court crafted a new rule in Arizona v. Gant, under which the police
would have violated Davis’s rights. 126 The Court concluded that—as
Davis’s case was still on direct review—he would receive the retroactive application of the Gant rule, and therefore that police did violate
his Fourth Amendment rights. 127 But the Court returned to its reasoning that a Fourth Amendment violation does not automatically
trigger exclusion; rather, exclusion will only follow if it deters future
118. Id. at 2426. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Kagan
joined in the majority opinion.
119. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
120. Id. (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
121. Id. at 2426–27 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
122. Id. at 2427.
123. Id. (citing Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 143 (2009)).
124. Id. at 2428.
125. Id. The Belton rule stated that officers could search the passenger compartment of
an automobile incident to a lawful arrest of an occupant of a vehicle. Id. at 2424 (citing
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981)).
126. Under Gant, an automobile search incident to an occupant’s arrest is constitutional (1) if the arrestee if within reaching distance of the vehicle during the search, or (2) if
the police have reason to believe that the vehicle contains evidence relevant to the crime
of arrest. Id. at 351.
127. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2431.
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police misconduct. 128 Since the police acted in reliance on binding
precedent, the Court concluded that the “absence of police culpability dooms Davis’s claim,” 129 and therefore the exclusionary rule would
not apply. 130
Speaking to the dissent, the Court argued that this reasoning was
not incompatible with the Court’s “retroactivity precedent under Griffith.” 131 The Court reasoned that the retroactivity jurisprudence is only “concerned with whether . . . a new rule is available on direct review
as a potential ground for relief.” 132 Retroactivity merely “lifts what
would otherwise be a categorical bar” to Davis’s opportunity for obtaining redress, but retroactivity “does not . . . determine what the
‘appropriate remedy’ (if any) the defendant should obtain.” 133 The
Court concluded that “retroactive application of a new rule of substantive Fourth Amendment law raises the question whether [evidence
will be excluded but] it does not answer that question.” 134
The Court further rejected Davis’s argument that its decision
would “stunt the development of Fourth Amendment law.” 135 The
Court suggested that this line of thinking misconstrues the role of the
exclusionary rule, which exists solely to deter future police misconduct: The rule was not designed to facilitate a defendant’s ability to
challenge existing precedent. 136
Writing in dissent, Justice Breyer rejected the Court’s application
of the good-faith exception to an officer’s reliance on binding appellate precedent. 137 He argued that the Court had previously rejected
as unworkable the idea of considering an officer’s reliance on
precedent in favor of a clear approach, under which any new rule for
the conduct of criminal prosecutions would apply retroactively to all
cases pending on direct review. 138 Justice Breyer suggested that a return to an inquiry of whether an officer was acting in “objectively reasonable . . . reliance on binding appellate precedent” would require a
case-by-case analysis that was highly fact-dependent and result in
128. Id.
129. Id. at 2428.
130. Id. at 2434.
131. Id. at 2430.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 2430–31.
134. Id. at 2431 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984)).
135. Id. at 2432.
136. Id. The Court stressed that it had “repeatedly rejected efforts to expand the focus
of the exclusionary rule beyond deterrence of culpable police conduct.” Id.
137. Id. at 2437 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 2436.
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“complex legal argument and police force confusion.” 139 He further
argued that “the Court’s distinction between (1) retroactive application of a new rule and (2) availability of a remedy is highly artificial
and runs counter to precedent.” 140 He suggested that “the source of a
new rule is the Constitution itself,” and when the Court applies a new
rule retroactively, it is not determining “the temporal scope of a newly
announced right, but whether a violation of [that] right . . . prior to
the announcement of the new rule will entitle a criminal defendant to
the relief sought.” 141 Here, the Court conceded that the police
search, like the search in Gant, violated Davis’s rights, but unlike
Gant, Davis was not entitled to the same remedy of suppression of
evidence. 142 This, Justice Breyer concluded, left Davis with a right
without a remedy. 143
Perhaps most importantly, Justice Breyer suggested, the Court’s
decision threatened to undermine well-settled Fourth Amendment
law. 144 He remarked that the Court had created very few exceptions
to the exclusionary rule on the basis of police good faith. 145 Justice
Breyer reasoned that this is because in many of the cases where defendants sought suppression, police had acted in good faith but still
violated the Fourth Amendment rights of the individual. 146 For the
Court now to apply the exclusionary rule only when police have acted
either recklessly, grossly negligently, or in bad faith would affect so
many cases that “the ‘good faith’ exception will swallow the exclusionary rule.” 147 Justice Breyer concluded that the Fourth Amendment
would no longer protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. 148

139. Id. at 2437 (quoting the majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
140. Id.
141. Id. (quoting Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 271 (2008)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
142. Id. at 2436.
143. Id. at 2437.
144. Id. at 2438–39.
145. Id. at 2439. Justice Breyer listed the various good faith exceptions where the police
acted on: a defective warrant, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); a mistake in a
court database, Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995); a mistake in a police database, Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009); and an unconstitutional statute authorizing the
search, Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987). Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2439 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
146. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2439.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 2440.
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IV. ANALYSIS
In Davis v. United States, the Supreme Court held that where police violate a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights in conducting a
search, but do so in good-faith reliance on binding appellate
precedent, the evidence found in that illegal search is admissible at
trial. 149 This decision incorrectly expands the deterrence rationale of
the exclusionary rule onto the retroactivity doctrine, sweeping principle away and leaving a right with no remedy. 150 It represents another step away from principle to a flawed, deterrence-only rationale in
the Court’s exclusionary rule jurisprudence. 151 As a result, the Court
has created a system that dramatically reduces the adversarial process
and threatens to stultify Fourth Amendment litigation as a whole. 152
It encourages an unhealthy gaming of the system for defense attorneys while simultaneously encouraging constitutional violations on
the part of law enforcement. 153 As an alternative, the Court should
have refused to create a new good-faith exception based on overturned law, and instead applied the retroactivity doctrine as it has
been well understood. 154
A. A Right With No Remedy: Adherence to Deterrence Sweeps Away All
Principle
The Davis decision marked another step on the steady march
away from principle. In refusing to properly apply the Gant rule retroactively, the Court ignored its own precedent regarding retroactivity while also refusing to apply the most basic principles of justice.
Sadly, this decision was simply the next logical step in an irrational jurisprudence regarding the role of the exclusionary rule.
1. What’s in a Name? The Davis Good-Faith Exception Tramples
the Court’s Retroactivity Doctrine and Acknowledges a Right with
No Remedy
The Davis decision, which in name created a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, in practice overturned the Court’s jurisprudence on the retroactive application of decisions regarding constitutional rights. The Court attempted to sidestep this criticism by
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 2423–24 (majority opinion).
See infra Part IV.A.1.
See infra Part IV.A.2.
See infra Part IV.B.1.
See infra Part IV.B.2.
See infra Part IV.C.
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suggesting that retroactive application of a rule does not imply retroactive application of a remedy. This logic ignores the Court’s own
statements regarding retroactivity and the underlying reasoning of
the retroactivity doctrine. The result is a decision that ignores fundamental principles of justice and leaves a right with no remedy.
When the Court created a good-faith exception for reliance on
subsequently overturned precedent, it overturned the current standard for retroactivity and returned to a previously rejected standard.
Prior to Davis, cases involving good-faith exceptions focused on
whether the violation that occurred warranted evidence suppression,
while retroactivity focused on whether a particular defendant was entitled to relief. 155 But Davis’s new good-faith exception for overturned
precedent conflated those two issues and now asks the same question
for suppression as it does for retroactivity: whether a defendant will
benefit from a new decision holding that conduct once thought to be
constitutional is now regarded as unconstitutional. 156 This is why, in
reading Davis, it is hard to distinguish its reasoning from the previously rejected retroactivity doctrine under Linkletter and its progeny. 157
The Court responded to this criticism by suggesting that it was in fact
applying the Gant rule retroactively, but that retroactive application of
a rule does not guarantee application of a remedy. 158
The problem with this defense is that it ignores the Court’s own
language to the contrary. In Davis, the Court reasoned that “retroactivity . . . is concerned with whether . . . a new rule is available . . . as a
potential ground for relief,” not whether relief would be granted. 159
Prior to Davis, however, the Court had stated the exact opposite: the
question of retroactivity is not whether a new rule would apply, but

155. Orin S. Kerr, Good Faith, New Law, and the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 99 GEO. L.J.
1077, 1103 (2011).
156. Id. at 1103–04.
157. Compare Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426, 2428 (2011) (resting the
Court’s holding on the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule and the police reliance
on precedent), with Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 635–36 (1965) (refusing to apply
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), retroactively onto state decisions because it would not
serve the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule and because state courts had relied
on a pre-Mapp lack of exclusion), overruled by Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987). See
also United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 537 (1975) (noting that retroactivity turned on
whether “law enforcement officers reasonably believed in good faith that evidence they
had seized was admissible at trial . . . even if decisions subsequent to the search or seizure
have broadened the exclusionary rule to encompass evidence seized in that manner”).
158. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2430.
159. Id.
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rather whether the remedy for a violation of that rule was available. 160
Because the Court has not technically announced a new rule at all,
the question was not whether a new rule would apply. 161 Rather, what
the Court has done is correct what was an earlier, erroneous interpretation of the law. 162 The Gant Court did not create a new rule for automobile searches; it corrected an earlier, incorrect understanding of
the Constitution in relation to automobile searches. 163 Therefore,
Davis’s right already existed, and required no retroactive application.
This understanding is consistent with the Court’s understanding
of its own role. Dating back to its common-law origins, the role of the
court has always been to declare what the law is and not to create new
laws that require retroactive application. 164 Under this logic, a “newly
announced” constitutional rule requires no retroactive application
because the rule pre-existed the Court’s announcement of that
rule. 165 Retroactivity is only concerned with whether a remedy should
apply. Therefore, the Court should have excluded the evidence recovered from the unlawful search of Davis’s jacket, rather than simply
acknowledging that his rights were violated without granting him a
remedy. 166 By refusing to grant Davis a new trial where the illegally
obtained evidence would be excluded, the Court effectively over160. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 271 (2008) (“What we are actually determining when we assess the ‘retroactivity’ of a new rule is . . . whether a violation of the
right that occurred prior to the announcement of the new rule will entitle a criminal defendant to the relief sought.”) (cited in Davis 131 S. Ct. at 2437 (Breyer, J. dissenting)).
The Court cites Powell v. Nevada, 511 U.S. 79, 84 (1994), to defend its position that retroactive application does not require relief. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2431 (majority opinion). But
the Powell decision, while concerned with retroactive application of a remedy, is distinguishable. In Powell, the Court remanded the case to the Nevada Supreme Court without
instructions for a remedy because, among other things, there was no remedy yet established for the violation in question—an excessive delay before a probable cause determination hearing. Powell, 511 U.S. at 84. Although subject to numerous exceptions, suppression of evidence is still the recognized remedy for Fourth Amendment violations. See
Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426 (acknowledging that the exclusionary rule serves to “compel respect for the constitutional guaranty” of the Fourth Amendment).
161. Danforth, 554 U.S. at 271.
162. Id.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 48–52.
164. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that Court decisions “declar[e] what the law already is,” rather than
“creat[e] the law”) (emphasis removed); see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*
69–71 (explaining that judges do not “make a new law, but [rather] vindicate the old one
from misrepresenatation”).
165. Danforth, 554 U.S. at 271; cf. Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ,
and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 59–60 (1966) (discussing the
Blackstonian interpretation of discovering the law and how courts, in deciding cases, necessarily apply rules retroactively).
166. United States v. Davis, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2431 (2011).
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turned Griffith v. Kentucky, in which it had held that new decisions regarding criminal procedure would apply retroactively to cases on direct review. 167 In doing so, the Court violated the principled justifications for retroactivity: the requirement that courts apply the law as
they understand it and treat similarly situated defendants the same. 168
The deterrence rationale applied in Davis sweeps away the principled justification of judicial integrity underlying the current retroactivity doctrine. The Court has its power of judicial review because the
people trust that it will resolve all cases on direct review in accordance
with its understanding of constitutional principles. 169 With the Davis
decision, the Court created an exception that allows appellate courts
to ignore the current understanding of the law. In this case, the Eleventh Circuit and the Supreme Court refused to properly apply the
Gant rule to Davis’s case, even though the Gant rule represented the
Court’s current understanding of the constitutionality of automobile
searches incident to arrest. 170 When the Court reaches a conclusion
about a rule of law, but then refuses to apply that rule of law to cases
properly before it, the Court’s own validity and integrity comes into
question. 171
Even worse, the Davis decision explicitly states that similarly situated defendants will be treated differently. Rodney Gant received
the benefit of exclusion of evidence, 172 while Willie Davis did not
simply because his case reached appellate courts second. 173 Treating
167. See supra text accompanying notes 107–115.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 112–115.
169. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the
judgments of two of the three consolidated cases and dissenting in one) (“If we do not resolve all cases before us on direct review in light of our best understanding of governing
constitutional principles, it is difficult to see why we should so adjudicate any case at
all. . . . [T]he Court’s assertion of power to disregard current law in adjudicating cases before us that have not already run the full course of appellate review, is quite simply an assertion that our constitutional function is not one of adjudication but in effect of legislation.”).
170. See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2423–24 (refusing to suppress the gun found in Davis’s jacket even though the search was unconstitutional under Gant); United States v. Davis, 598
F.3d 1259, 1268 (11th Cir. 2010) (same).
171. See Mackey, 401 U.S. at 679 (stating that courts of law must resolve cases on direct
review under the best understanding of the law at the time); see also JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 235 (1971) (noting that the rule of law is compromised when judges
fail to apply the appropriate rule as a part of regular and impartial administration of justice).
172. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009).
173. Although, in this instance, it makes sense that Davis reached appeal second. Rodney Gant was originally arrested on August 25, 1999, id. at 335, and his first motion to suppress was denied on June 5, 2000, State v. Gant, No. CR-20000042, 2000 WL 35630010
(Ariz. Super. Ct. June 5, 2000). This was the beginning of eight years of litigation for Gant,
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similarly situated defendants differently violates not only the retroactivity doctrine, but also our most basic principles of justice. 174 Even a
child can accept an arbitrary parental decision—such as no television
after school—provided that decision is applied equally to brother and
sister alike. 175 That is why equal treatment under the law is applied
outside the context of retroactivity 176 and has been affirmed time and
again by the Supreme Court. 177 Equal treatment under the law is necessary to our sense of justice, and requires that like defendants be
treated alike.
The end result in Davis is a decision that violates the basic principle that every right must have a remedy. 178 Remarkably, the Court
freely admits this point. 179 But remedies define rights. 180 And the Supreme Court has recognized the exclusion of evidence as the appropriate remedy for Fourth Amendment violations, without which the
right is reduced to a mere “form of words.” 181 It seems that some Justices on the Court would be more content with using other remedies
including two separate grants of certiorari by the Supreme Court of the United States. See
Arizona v. Gant, 552 U.S. 1230 (2008); Arizona v. Gant, 538 U.S. 976 (2003). Davis was
originally arrested in April of 2007. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2425. The point remains true, however, that Gant had his final appeal on direct review decided on April 21, 2009, before the
Supreme Court, while Davis did not finish his direct review until June 16, 2011. See Gant,
556 U.S. at 332; Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2421.
174. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 226–27 (1977) (discussing the
rights under the Equal Protection Clause to equal treatment and to treatment as an equal,
whereby every person has the right “to be treated with the same respect and concern as
anyone else”); see also Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency, Pragmatism, and Critique of History
in Adjudication and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 588 (2000) (offering the notion
“that justice demands that like cases be treated alike” as a reason for applying precedent to
like-situated defendants).
175. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178
(1989) (illustrating the importance of “appearance of equal treatment”).
176. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
177. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (noting that prosecutions
of defendants are subject to constitutional restraints under the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause and cannot be arbitrarily ignored).
178. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803).
179. See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2430–31 (2011) (acknowledging the application of the Gant rule, but only as a potential ground for relief).
180. See PAUL SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS
26–27 (1983) (rejecting utilitarian arguments regarding the efficiency of rights and arguing that the remedy of rights is essential to the court’s legitimacy).
181. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391–92 (1920); see also Yale
Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a “Principled Basis” Rather than an
“Empirical Proposition”?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 600 (1983) (arguing that, because
courts must “give meaning to constitutional values,” exclusion is a necessary remedy of the
Fourth Amendment); Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins,
Development, and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
1365, 1389 (1983) (rejecting other possible remedies for Fourth Amendment violations).
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for Fourth Amendment violations. 182 But this suggestion ignores the
decision to make the exclusionary rule applicable to the states in part
because the states failed to come up with valid, alternative remedies
for Fourth Amendment violations. 183 The Davis decision has shone a
spotlight on what has been an inherently flawed rationale underlying
the Court’s exclusionary rule jurisprudence.
2. Principle Denied: The Court’s Turn Away from the Principled
Justification of the Retroactivity Doctrine Is the Next Step in a
Turn Away from Principle in the Exclusionary Rule
The Davis decision, in acknowledging a right with no remedy,
was the next logical step in the Court’s irrational exclusionary rule jurisprudence. Over the last forty years, the Court has shifted its focus
from the rights of the defendant to the culpability of the police. Each
time the Court created a good-faith exception to the exclusionary
rule, it relied on a faulty premise: Deterrence of police conduct is the
sole justification for the exclusion of evidence. 184 The Court has used
this logic to say that when police act in good faith, they cannot be deterred and exclusion should not apply. 185 The logic seems sound, except that the premise ignores the Court’s original, principled justifications of the exclusionary rule. 186 Additionally, the deterrence-only
justification is internally flawed and not based on the empirical study
that the Court’s cost-benefit analysis demands. 187 Ultimately, this log182. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597–98 (2006) (writing for the majority, Justice Scalia suggested that a civil remedy, a Section 1983 lawsuit, was not available at the
time of Mapp, but may serve as an effective alternative to exclusion). There is constant discussion of alternative remedies for Fourth Amendment violations. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111 (2003) (suggesting sentencing reductions as a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations); Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the
Fourth Amendment, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 49 (proposing tort sanctions against officers and departments). But no proposed alternatives are as effective as the exclusionary rule. Sam J.
Ervin, Jr., The Exclusionary Rule: An Essential Ingredient of the Fourth Amendment, 1983 SUP. CT.
REV. 283, 296–97.
183. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651–53 (1961); see also Roger J. Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio
at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319, 321–22 (detailing the former California Supreme Court justice’s conversion to the exclusionary rule as a necessary corollary to the
Fourth Amendment); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REV. 349, 360 (1974) (suggesting that other remedies for Fourth Amendment violations are not “as a practical matter, maintainable,” and that the exclusionary rule is the
“primary instrument for enforcing the fourth amendment”).
184. See supra text accompanying notes 86–97.
185. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 141–44 (2009) (explaining the rationale of the good-faith exception and enumerating the times where the Court has applied it).
186. See supra text accompanying notes 55–59, 64–71.
187. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.

2012]

DAVIS v. UNITED STATES

1281

ic sets the exclusionary rule on an unstable foundation that has toppled over and destroyed the principled justifications underlying the
retroactivity doctrine.
At its inception, the exclusionary rule rested on a principled idea
that the government should not benefit from its own law breaking. 188
In particular, the Court was concerned with the idea of judicial integrity and the notion that courts should not approve prior constitutional
violations by allowing the fruits of those violations to be used at trial. 189 This theme resonated through decades of Supreme Court jurisprudence, 190 culminating in the incorporation of the exclusionary
rule against the states. 191 The Court noted that exclusion was implicit
in the Constitution, 192 and necessary to ensure the guarantees of the
Fourth Amendment. 193
When deterrence first emerged as a rationale for exclusion, it was
as an additional sword to justify the exclusionary rule as a means of
guaranteeing that officers and agencies comply with the Fourth
Amendment. 194 But the Court turned the deterrence justification on
its head: rather than being used to further justify exclusion, the Court
began to question the continued validity of the exclusionary rule in
the absence of definitive proof of its deterrent value. 195 Ultimately,
188. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (emphasizing that unlawful
conduct of the government violating constitutional rights “should find no sanction in the
judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution
and to which people . . . have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental
rights”).
189. Id. at 392, 398.
190. See supra note 59.
191. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The Court continued its principled justification in Mapp, stating that “no man is to be convicted on unconstitutional evidence.” Id. at
657.
192. Id. at 649; see also Ervin, supra note 182, at 287 (calling the exclusionary rule a necessary “guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures”). But see Akhil Reed Amar,
Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 785–86 (1994) (arguing that the
Fourth Amendment does not require exclusion of evidence, that exclusion was never conceived by the Framers, and that a tort action against law enforcement is the clear and appropriate remedy).
193. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
194. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (noting that “[t]he rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair,” and concluding that the way to compel respect for the
Fourth Amendment is to remove the incentive to disregard it); see also David C. Gray, A
Spectacular Non Sequitur, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 43 n.305)
(noting that deterrence served to justify exclusion, but did not replace principle as the sole
justification).
195. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 416–17 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (questioning the effectiveness of the
exclusionary rule without clear proof that it serves to actually deter police from violating
the Fourth Amendment); cf. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (reason-
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the Court turned away from the original, principled justifications and
classified them as mere dicta. 196 This has relegated the principled justifications of the exclusionary rule to the dissenting dustbins. 197 Rather than using deterrence to further justify exclusion, the lack of deterrence became a shield to defend the creation of exceptions that
would dramatically limit the scope of the exclusionary rule. 198
Besides ignoring prior precedent, a deterrent-only rationale is internally flawed. Under its current rationale, the Court has treated the
exclusion of evidence as a punishment for police misconduct rather
than a guarantee of constitutional rights. 199 This punishment approach is built on a fallacy. Simply because exclusion would not deter
officers who acted in good faith does not mean that exclusion would
not deter future officers from engaging in unlawful behavior. 200 The
Court has crafted good-faith exceptions by focusing solely on specific
deterrence—deterrence of those officers who acted in good faith—
rather than on the general deterrence to be gained by excluding all
ing that the exclusionary rule does not automatically bar the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings, but only when the purpose of deterrence is “most efficaciously
served”).
196. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (“Expansive dicta in
Mapp . . . suggested wide scope for the exclusionary rule.”).
197. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 152 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the exclusionary rule not only deters police misconduct but also allows “the judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership in official lawlessness” (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 357 (Brennan, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
198. See id. at 147–48 (majority opinion) (refusing to exclude evidence where police
conduct was negligent at best and was therefore not deterrable); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S.
1, 14–15 (1995) (reasoning that police could not be deterred when they relied on a court
database informing them of an outstanding warrant and therefore evidence obtained
should not be excluded); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 353 (1987) (holding that evidence
should not be excluded where police rely on a statute authorizing warrantless searches and
would therefore not be deterred); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984) (concluding that, because police will not be deterred where they rely on a magistrate’s warrant,
evidence should not be excluded); Calandra, 414 U.S. at 351–52 (concluding that, because
police are only concerned with criminal trials, evidence should be admitted at a grand jury
proceeding as it would not deter police misconduct); see also Gray, supra note 194, at 10
(arguing that deterrence has been used as a shield for exceptions to the exclusionary rule,
though it is ill-equipped to do so).
199. See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2423, 2428 (2011) (referring to the
“sanction” of exclusion for police misconduct and concluding that the absence of police
culpability “dooms Davis’s claim”). On top of continually referring to exclusion as a sanction, the Court’s focus on the police’s level of culpability in determining whether or not to
apply the exclusionary rule suggests that exclusion is a punishment. See Herring, 555 U.S.
at 137 (stating that the exclusion of evidence turns on the culpability of the police and
therefore the potential to deter wrongful conduct); see also Sharon L. Davies, The Penalty of
Exclusion—A Price or Sanction?, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1275, 1311 (2000) (suggesting that exclusion acts as a sanction to penalize police for their misconduct).
200. Gray, supra note 194, at 9–10.
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evidence obtained because of constitutional violations. 201 It is true
that the individual officers who searched Davis’s car acted in accordance with what they reasonably believed was the law and so therefore
cannot be deterred. 202 But that does not mean that imposing exclusion could not function as an institutional deterrence, cautioning law
enforcement from taking unnecessary risks. 203
Moreover, the Court’s rationale claims to be based on empirical
research regarding the costs and benefits of the exclusionary rule, 204
but in fact has little evidence to support any of its claims. 205 Studies
comparing the effectiveness of police deterrence against the number
of lost convictions are largely inconclusive. 206 But the Court continues
to make claims about the huge social costs of the exclusionary rule. 207
These are largely anecdotal and are best summed up by Judge Cardozo’s refrain that “[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable has

201. See William J. Mertens & Silas Wasserstrom, Foreword: The Good Faith Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365, 369 (1981)
(referring to the rationale underlying the good-faith exceptions as “premised on a naive
and simplistic understanding of deterrence”).
202. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2438 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Randy E. Barnett, Resolving
the Dilemma of the Exclusionary Rule: An Application of Restitutive Principles of Justice, 32 EMORY
L.J. 937, 951–52 (1983) (arguing that one of the factors one must take into account to determine the feasibility of deterring police is whether or not police know their action is illegal).
203. Posner, supra note 182, at 66. Judge Posner rejected the idea that exclusion could
not deter even in the face of those acting in good faith since the exclusion remedy could
compel officers to take steps to reduce the probability of committing even innocent violations. Id.; see also Gray, supra note 194, at 37 (reasoning that exclusion of evidence can act
as a general deterrent even where the individual police conduct was non-culpable); Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 201, at 394–95 (arguing that the exclusionary rule acts as a
systemic deterrence because police departments institutionalize judicially articulated standards for the Fourth Amendment).
204. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974) (reasoning that the
decision whether to exclude evidence should be based on weighing the costs and benefits
of exclusion).
205. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 943 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the deterrence rationale for purporting to be rooted in empiricism but offering “only limited empirical support”).
206. See Bradley C. Canon, Ideology and Reality in the Debate Over the Exclusionary Rule: A
Conservative Argument for Its Retention, 23 S. TEX. L.J. 558, 572 (1982) (“There is no way to
demonstrate that the rule works or that it does not work . . . .”). For an earlier study of the
exclusionary rule’s effectiveness, with equally mixed results, see generally Dallin H. Oaks,
Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970).
207. See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427 (“The analysis must also account for the ‘substantial
social costs’ generated by the rule.” (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 907)); see also Herring v.
United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009) (referring to the “substantial social costs” of excluding evidence) (quoting Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 352–53 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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blundered.” 208 While a clever turn of phrase, 209 the statement does
little to provide actual evidence of how often criminals actually “go
free” because evidence is suppressed. The argument remains compelling, however, since the exclusionary rule flies in the face of general
rules of evidence that would admit otherwise probative and reliable
evidence. 210
Now the deterrence-only rationale has gone from a sword justifying the exclusionary rule, to a shield defending its exceptions, and finally a large club to smash away any other doctrines in its path. It was
the next logical step in what has been an irrational jurisprudence that
acknowledges a right with no remedy. The Court had previously rejected the Davis logic twenty-five years ago in the name of principle. 211
Now the Court returns to its previously rejected rationale, and Willie
Davis does not get the same relief that Rodney Gant did. The Court
recognizes that Davis’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated, but
he gets no remedy. Going forward, the Davis decision will create
many problems not only in principle, but in practice as well.
B. Right With No Remedy Applied: The Government Always Wins
The Davis decision creates a number of problems going forward.
Given that defendants have little hope for a remedy, the new goodfaith exception stultifies Fourth Amendment law. As defendants have
little incentive to challenge existing law, the adversarial process is reduced to an exercise in futility. Furthermore, given that evidence
would be admitted under the new exception even if the defendant
208. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926). Put another way, a large part of
the problem people have with the exclusionary rule is that—because it is only invoked by
alleged criminals seeking to suppress incriminating evidence—it “rubs our noses in it.”
John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1037 (1974).
209. It is nearly impossible to read an exclusionary rule decision or scholarly work that
does not use this quote. See, e.g., Herring, 555 U.S. at 148; Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S.
586, 614 (2006); Thomas Y. Davies, The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh
Away: The Century of Fourth Amendment “Search and Seizure” Doctrine, 100 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 933, 970 (2010).
210. See Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L.
REV. 929, 951 (1965) (noting that the exclusionary rule does not exist to protect against
unreliable evidence being admitted); Francis A. Allen, The Exclusionary Rule in the American
Law of Search and Seizure, 52 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCIENCE 246, 251 (1961)
(noting the Anglo-American principle that illegal procurement does not necessarily render competent evidence incompetent); Barnett, supra note 202, at 941 (explaining that the
exclusionary rule may result in suppression of “unquestionably reliable and probative”
evidence).
211. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322–24, 328 (1987) (overruling Linkletter and
holding that all new rules for criminal procedure will apply retroactively to all cases pending on direct review or not yet final).
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wins on the merits of his case, courts can pass on evaluating constitutional issues under a harmless-error analysis. 212 This makes it difficult
for defendants to decide how to best litigate their cases: either by attempting to race through the court system or in some instances wait
in jail for trial to start. 213 For law enforcement, the Davis decision incentivizes excessive constitutional violations with little fear of repercussions. 214
1. No Matter How Well a Defendant Argues His Case, the
Government Will Win
In creating a good-faith exception based on reliance of subsequently overturned law, the Court has threatened to end the evolution of the Fourth Amendment law by reducing the adversarial
process to such an extent that defendants may not even have standing
to appeal their cases. Additionally, courts can avoid addressing constitutional questions as Fourth Amendment violations can now be
treated as a harmless error.
The Davis rule greatly diminishes the adversarial process. Our
judicial process rests on the idea “that the parties before the court
have an actual . . . stake in the outcome,” and that this “preserves the
vitality of the adversarial process.” 215 Defendants like Davis will have
no stake in the outcome of evidentiary challenges, since they know
they will not benefit from the exclusion of evidence under the newly
crafted good-faith exception. 216 Arguments on evidentiary issues under the Fourth Amendment before the Court will be less effective because the parties involved do not have a real interest in the result, and
the evolution of the law will be stunted. 217 Defendants might continue to make arguments, but only to make changes in the law for the
benefit of future defendants. 218 Courts following Davis will in essence

212. See infra Part IV.B.1.
213. See infra Part IV.B.2.
214. See infra Part IV.B.2.
215. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 581 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring);
see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (explaining that the adversarial
system is crucial to achieving just results).
216. See Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 201, at 371 (suggesting that good-faith exceptions will stultify the Fourth Amendment by removing the incentive for defendants to
litigate issues).
217. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (requiring that parties have a real stake
in the outcome of the case so as to sharpen the arguments “upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions”).
218. Brief for Petitioner at 34, Davis v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2419 (2011) (No. 0911328), 2010 WL 5168874, at *34.
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be offering advisory opinions—statements of the law that do not affect
the parties before the court—which are expressly forbidden. 219
If defendants try to bring litigation where they have no hope for
a remedy, it is possible they will not even have standing to challenge
adverse evidentiary rulings. Article III standing requires “that a favorable judicial decision will prevent or redress the injury.” 220 Under the
Court’s Davis rationale, if a defendant challenges an existing Supreme
Court or circuit court Fourth Amendment precedent, the outcome
will always be the same: the government always wins.221 Either the
Court agrees with the government on the Fourth Amendment issue
and therefore rules for the government on the merits, or the Court
agrees with the defendant on the Fourth Amendment issue but the
evidence gets admitted anyway under the expanded good-faith exception. 222 The good-faith exception removes the Court’s ability “to redress the defendant’s injury, eliminating Article III standing” for defendants challenging established Fourth Amendment law. 223 If the
Court is not adjudicating cases on the merits, it is unclear why the
Court should hear them at all. 224
Fourth Amendment law will further stultify as courts can avoid
reviewing constitutional issues under a harmless-error analysis. When
defendants raise issues on appeal, appellate courts can ignore any error “that does not affect substantial rights.” 225 The Court has said that
an error does not affect substantial rights if it did not affect how the
jury reached its verdict, 226 and has even said that this can apply to violations of constitutional rights. 227 Defendants attempting to exclude
219. Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975) (“[A] federal court has neither the
power to render advisory opinions nor to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of
litigants in the case before them.” (quoting North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246
(1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
220. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009).
221. See Kerr, supra note 155, at 1082 (arguing that creating a good-faith exception for
overturned law would skew all Fourth Amendment litigation in the government’s favor).
222. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 218, at 26.
223. Id.
224. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the
judgments of two of the three consolidated cases and dissenting in one).
225. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a).
226. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946) (explaining that the significance of an error is determined by the “effect the error had or reasonably may be taken
to have had upon the jury’s decision”).
227. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967) (“[T]here may be some constitutional errors which . . . are so unimportant and insignificant that they may . . . be deemed
harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction.”); see also Jeffrey O.
Cooper, Searching for Harmlessness: Method and Madness in the Supreme Court’s Harmless Constitutional Error Doctrine, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 309, 317–18 (2002) (discussing the implications of
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evidence as the result of a Fourth Amendment violation will not have
their challenges reviewed since, under Davis, the constitutional violation is harmless: either the defendant loses his challenge on the merits, therefore no constitutional violation and evidence is admitted; or
the defendant wins his challenge but law enforcement acted in good
faith, so evidence gets admitted anyway.
The Court responded to these criticisms by suggesting that open
questions of Fourth Amendment law in certain jurisdictions would
still provide an avenue for constitutional litigation, 228 but this argument cannot withstand scrutiny. Even for open questions, it is difficult to see how law enforcement could not qualify for the new goodfaith test of reliance on overturned precedent. For example, consider
United States v. Jones, 229 where the issue was whether the police use of a
GPS tracking device on the defendant’s car without a warrant violated
his Fourth Amendment rights.230 Neither the Founding Fathers nor
the Supreme Court has ever before considered the validity of such a
practice under the Constitution, which makes it ostensibly an open
issue of Fourth Amendment law. All defendants similarly situated to
Jones, whose Fourth Amendment rights had been violated prior to
the Jones decision but whose cases are still on direct review, are without a remedy after Davis.
Indeed, under Davis, in the context of Jones, law enforcement
could plausibly argue that, given that they had no direction on
whether or not their actions were in violation of the Fourth Amendment, their actions were reasonable and therefore exclusion would

the Chapman decision). Compounding this problem is that in a different context the Supreme Court has more recently held that appellate courts do not have to decide the merits
of a constitutional challenge before deciding whether that constitutional violation was
harmless. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (rejecting the two-prong analysis for qualified immunity questions under Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)). Under
Saucier, courts were required to answer first whether there was a violation of a constitutional right, and only after that could they determine whether that right was properly established. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. The Pearson Court maintained that this approach was preferred, but explained that it is no longer mandated. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
228. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2433 (2011).
229. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). This case arose from a D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals case
where two appellants, Antoine Jones and Lawrence Maynard, appealed their convictions
after a joint trial for conspiracy to distribute. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544
(D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3064.
230. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. Specifically, the two questions raised at the appellate level
were whether the placement of the GPS on the car constituted a search at all, and, if so,
whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy that would prevent the police from tracking his movement in the car twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 555.
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achieve no deterrence and should not apply. 231 At worst, law enforcement’s actions in relation to open questions would be Fourth
Amendment-neutral. 232 The Court could reasonably conclude that
deterrence is not advanced where police did not know their actions
233
were unlawful, and thus refuse to suppress evidence.
Additionally, the government may try to turn a seemingly open
question into one already resolved by precedent. In Jones, the government argued that it relied on binding appellate precedent when it
used the GPS devices. 234 The argument was not implausible and, had
the facts not included other Fourth Amendment violations resolving
235
Going
the case, could have triggered the problems noted above.
forward, in cases like Jones, things will play out one of two ways: either
the Court finds in favor of the government on the merits of the case
and the petitioner loses; or it accepts petitioner’s argument, but still
finds that the police were acting in reasonable reliance on binding
appellate precedent. 236 In each scenario, the petitioner will not bene-

231. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 (1984) (noting that exclusion “should
not be applied . . . to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity”).
232. Ultimately, the Jones Court spent no time addressing whether or not a remedy
should apply for Jones. There, however, Fourth Amendment violations included more
than simply the open question of whether the use of a GPS device implicated the Fourth
Amendment. The officers in Jones had received a ten-day warrant for the use of the device
in Washington, D.C., but installed the device on Jones’s car on the eleventh day and in
Maryland. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
233. At least one court has noted with approval this argument post-Jones. See United
States v. Luna-Santillanes, No. 11-20492, 2012 WL 1019601, at *7 n.5 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 26,
2012) (acknowledging the persuasiveness of the government’s argument that the police
use of a GPS was reasonable, given that it was not held unconstitutional by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, and so exclusion would do nothing to deter police misconduct).
234. See Brief for the United States at 12, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012)
(No. 10-1259), 2011 WL 3561881, at *12 (arguing that police relied on the Supreme
Court’s decision in United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283–85 (1983), which allowed the
use of electronic devices to enhance what a person “knowingly expose[s] to the public”).
The government also argued that, under Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967), the
Fourth Amendment does not apply to what someone “knowingly expose[s] to the public,”
and so the tracking of the defendant’s movements in public cannot constitute a search. Id.
(quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351).
235. Three circuits had already either approved in a holding or noted with approval the
use of GPS devices. See, e.g., United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir.
2010) (rejecting Pineda-Moreno’s claim that attaching a mobile tracking device to his car
violated his Fourth Amendment rights); United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609–10
(8th Cir. 2010) (ruling that Marquez did not have standing to challenge the use of GPS
devices but also suggesting that the use of a GPS device is not a search as Marquez had no
reasonable expectation of privacy over the location of his car); United States v. Garcia, 474
F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007) (approving of the use of a GPS device on the car of an individual already under suspicion).
236. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
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fit from the exclusion of evidence and the government wins. 237 So
even “open” questions of Fourth Amendment law demean the adversarial process by giving litigants no real stake in the outcome of their
Fourth Amendment arguments, and allow courts to pass on difficult
questions under a harmless error review. 238
In response to this criticism, the Court said simply that overturning precedent is not a purpose of the exclusionary rule. 239 Again, the
Court used the exclusionary rule as a hammer to bludgeon any valid
challenges to its increasing number of exceptions. It is true that overturning case law is not a purpose of the exclusionary rule. But arriving at the proper meaning of the Constitution is a purpose of the adversarial process and of judicial review, and the Davis decision
jeopardizes that process in the context of Fourth Amendment evidentiary decisions. The Davis decision threatens not only the validity of
the judicial process, but negatively affects how lawyers and police act
as well.
2. Defendants Are Left with Unusual Tactics in the Hope of Getting
a Remedy, While Police Are Encouraged to Violate the Constitution
(the Government Wins)
Given that similar defendants will be treated differently and
there may be no hope for a remedy through the exclusionary rule, defendants are left with a choice of how best to manipulate the adjudication of their cases in order to get the best results. For defense attorneys, the Davis decision creates a “race to the courthouse”
scenario: each appellant will try to be the first one to reach appellate
review in the hope of receiving a remedy for the violation of his con237. This has already begun. The United States District Court for the Northern District
of Iowa recently admitted evidence gained from the warrantless use of a GPS device based
on the Davis good-faith exception that police had relied on binding appellate precedent.
United States v. Amaya, No. CR 11-4065-MWB, 2012 WL 1188456 (N.D. Iowa Apr. 10,
2012). The Amaya court used the Davis rationale in a particularly troublesome way. The
court reasoned that police relied on binding appellate precedent where the Eighth Circuit
had not definitively held that the use of a GPS device was legal. Amaya, 2012 WL 118456,
at *5 (citing Marquez, 605 F.3d at 610). Marquez had rejected a defendant’s Fourth
Amendment challenge to the use of GPS on standing grounds, but had noted in the alternative that the use would have been acceptable. Marquez, 605 F.3d at 609–10. The Amaya
court reasoned that this was not dicta, but rather an alternative holding, and concluded
that police reasonably relied on this alternative holding. Amaya, 2012 WL 118456, at *5.
This case reinforces Justice Breyer’s concern about the confusing nature of what makes for
legal precedent, Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2437 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting), and also shows how easy it can be for courts to interpret these types of Fourth
Amendment challenges in the government’s favor.
238. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
239. United States v. Davis, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2432 (2011).
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stitutional rights. 240 Conversely, some attorneys might try to delay the
beginning of a client’s trial, knowing that a pending Supreme Court
case could affect the outcome of the case, but that the client would
not benefit from any newly announced rule if her case has already begun and so sits in the Davis “direct review” purgatory. 241 This will actually provide defendants with an incentive to remain in jail longer
while awaiting trial.
The government, by contrast, will be emboldened to continue to
push the limits of constitutionally acceptable behavior. Police can
treat any ambiguous practice as having been already decided in their
favor, comfortable with the knowledge that the Court will later grant a
good-faith exception for their practices. For example, by the time
Arizona v. Gant was decided, police in many jurisdictions had been
applying Belton as a per se right to search automobiles rather than a
fact-dependent situation involving officer safety and the prevention of
destruction of evidence. 242 If it turned out law enforcement violated
the Fourth Amendment, as it was in those jurisdictions that applied
Belton as a per se right to search, evidence would still be admitted under the Davis good-faith exception.
Even for procedures not yet addressed by the Supreme Court,
police may feel completely comfortable continuing practices that the
Court may later decide are violations of the Fourth Amendment.
Consider once again United States v. Jones, the GPS-tracking case. 243
The government argued that police relied on precedent in determining that attaching GPS devices to automobiles and tracking suspects
over long periods was a constitutionally valid exercise. 244 Prior to Davis, from the moment the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear
Jones’s case, police would have had two choices: (1) continue the GPS
tracking in the hope that the Supreme Court decides in their favor;
(2) stop the procedure out of fear that the Supreme Court would decide the practice is invalid and invalidate evidence derived from the
240. It is actually unclear from the Davis decision, however, whether the first litigant to
reach appellate review will even receive the benefit of a remedy. Adhering strictly to the
Court’s own logic, when police act in good-faith reliance on precedent, even the first successful litigant may not have his evidence suppressed. So it is possible that even Rodney
Gant would not have benefitted from the Gant rule if his case had been litigated after the
Davis decision.
241. Cf. United States v. Davis, No. 2:07-cr-0248-WKW, 2008 WL 1927377, at *3 (M.D.
Ala. Apr. 28, 2008) (noting the preservation of the search issue in the hope that the Court
would change the Fourth Amendment landscape with its Gant decision).
242. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 627–28 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment).
243. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
244. Brief for the United States, supra note 234, at 12.
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illegal practice. After Davis, law enforcement now has a third option:
ramp up what could be a constitutionally-invalid procedure, knowing
that the Court will still admit the evidence under the new good-faith
exception. Law enforcement officers know they can continue to benefit from a potentially invalid procedure and will not suffer any of the
consequences for their actions since the actions were done in goodfaith reliance on binding precedent. For truly open questions, the
government could argue that law enforcement could not be deterred
from doing what it did not know was unlawful. So why not benefit
245
from the suspect practice as much as possible before it goes away?
Davis has created a system that incentivizes constitutional brinksmanship by law enforcement.
C. Return to Principle and Fourth Amendment Rights
As an alternative, the Court could have chosen to do nothing. In
other words, rather than create a new good-faith exception, the Court
should have applied its retroactivity jurisprudence appropriately and
given Davis the same remedy as Gant. Even accepting the Court’s jurisprudence regarding the costs and benefits of exclusion, the costs in
this case would be few, while the benefits would at least be maintaining the principled justifications of the retroactivity doctrine. Better
still, the Court could have recognized the problems of the deterrenceonly rationale and re-injected principle into its exclusionary rule jurisprudence. Doing so would place the exclusionary rule and the
Fourth Amendment on stable ground.
The Supreme Court could have simply followed its earlier holding that new rules of criminal procedure will apply retroactively to all
cases on direct review or otherwise not final. 246 Such a decision would
have maintained the principled justifications that the Court supplied
in Griffith when it abandoned the reasoning it now returns to in Davis. 247 Davis would have received a remedy for the violation of his
rights. Davis would have been treated the same way as Rodney Gant, a
similarly situated defendant. Granting defendants remedies will en-

245. As an example, following the Jones decision, the FBI took down about 3,000 GPS
trackers that were in use. Julia Angwin, FBI Turns Off Thousands of Devices After Supreme
Court Ruling, WALL ST. J. BLOG (April 29, 2012, 8:16 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits
/2012/02/25/fbi-turns-off-thousands-of-gps-devices-after-supreme-court-ruling/.
246. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987).
247. See id. at 322–27 (outlining the reasons for rejecting Linkletter).
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sure the healthy evolution of Fourth Amendment law by maintaining
a vital adversarial process. 248
Even accepting the Court’s cost-benefit analysis, applying the retroactivity law as it stood before Davis would cost very little. As the
costs of exclusion are severely limited already, 249 excluding tainted
evidence in cases like Davis would not greatly increase the social cost
of exclusion. 250 It is also exceedingly difficult to put an accurate number on just how many convictions are actually lost as a result of the
suppression of evidence. 251 Conversely, some of the benefits are
equally hard to quantify because they deal with the theoretical benefit
of rights. 252 Even so, those rights are so basic to our system of justice
that they must be protected. 253 Ideally, the Court would not only apply the principled justifications of the retroactivity doctrine, but take
this opportunity to reinvigorate the exclusionary rule with its principled justifications as well. 254 The Court in this case need not take
even that modest of a step; it could have simply drawn a line on deterrence at the walls of the principled retroactivity doctrine and properly
applied its own precedent.
248. See supra Part IV.B.1; see also Kerr, supra note 155, at 1082 (suggesting that proper
application of the exclusionary rule serves as a deterrent on the court system from reaching bad results, thereby enabling the evolution of good law).
249. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147–48 (2009) (creating a goodfaith exception for reliance on a negligently updated warrant list); United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984) (creating a good-faith exception for reliance on a magistrate’s
warrant).
250. Moreover, from the facts of this case, it is possible that the evidence could have
been admitted under the inventory exception to the exclusionary rule. See South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 375–76 (1976) (granting police the right to do an inventory
search of an arrestee’s automobile after impounding the vehicle). This issue was not challenged on appeal, and so was not briefed before the Supreme Court.
251. See supra note 206 and accompanying text (listing various empirical studies of the
costs of the exclusionary rule that ultimately came back inconclusive).
252. See Schuck, supra note 180, at 26 (“Rights preoccupy a Don Quixote; remedies are
the work of Sancho Panza.”).
253. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing that Fourth Amendment rights “are not mere second-class rights but belong in the
catalog of indispensible freedoms”). Justice Jackson had returned as a prosecutor from
the Nuremburg trials and recognized that one sure path to totalitarianism is to allow the
government to trespass into your home and effects without justification. Margaret Raymond, Rejecting Totalitarianism: Translating the Guarantees of Constitutional Criminal Procedure,
76 N.C. L. REV. 1193, 1227–29 & nn.118 & 120 (1998).
254. See Gray, supra note 194, at 3. Professor Gray draws an analogy between justifications for the exclusionary rule and common-law justifications for criminal punishment and
finds that deterrence alone cannot support exceptions to the exclusionary rule in the same
way that a deterrence rationale for criminal punishment cannot justify culpability-based
excuses from criminal punishment. Id. at 4–5, 9–10. He calls for a return to principle in
the context of the exclusionary rule. Id. at 3.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Davis decision incorrectly expanded the rationale of the exclusionary rule onto the retroactivity doctrine. As a result, the principles of treating similar defendants the same and providing a remedy
for rights have been swept away. 255 This decision diminishes the adversarial process by creating a system where the government always
wins and will in effect end the evolution of Fourth Amendment law. 256
In practice, Davis makes it impossible for defendants to decide how
best to litigate their cases while encouraging law enforcement to press
the edges of what is constitutionally acceptable. 257 The Court should
have simply applied the retroactivity doctrine the way its own
precedent demands. 258 This would have signaled that, in at least some
areas, principle still wins out over empirical pragmatism.

255.
256.
257.
258.

See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.B.1.
See supra Part IV.B.2.
See supra Part IV.C.

